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Introduction
Price discovery has become an issue of considerable concern in the livestock sector. Once
liquid local cash fed cattle and slaughter hog markets are rapidly being replaced with
non-cash methods of trade including contracts, marketing agreements, alliances, and
formula pricing arrangements.  As this occurs, cash market volumes decline, cash price
data become less readily available, and the representativeness of prices quoted from cash
transactions becomes increasingly suspect.  If recent trends continue, USDA cash market
slaughter livestock price quotes could soon be of limited value or might disappear
altogether.
As cash livestock markets decline in importance, university research and extension
program directions will likely change.  Some traditional programs will become less
important as increased knowledge and information needs arise in other areas.  Increased
dialogue is warranted regarding university research and extension roles in evolving
market institutions.  What are the magnitudes of externalities associated with liquid cash
market trade?  How will symmetry of information between packers and producers be
affected by changing marketing methods?  What knowledge and information needs arise
as cash markets become less important and contracts, marketing agreements, and
alliances become more common?   What is the most effective future role for livestock
marketing research and extension program efforts regarding evolving price discovery and
pricing issues?
This paper documents the essence of the price discovery concerns in livestock markets by
reviewing recent changes in livestock marketing methods.  Implications of these changes
are identified and the role of university research and extension programs in this evolution
is considered.
Price Discovery
Price discovery refers to the price associated with individual transactions. Price discovery
is the process by which buyers and sellers arrive at a price for a particular transaction.
Price discovery is uncertain because the two parties to a transaction do not have precise
information regarding demand and supply.  Rather, both buyers and sellers make
decisions based upon their interpretation of market fundamentals.  In this regard,
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discovered prices for individual transactions contain price bands around market demand
and supply (figure 1).  The bands indicate any individual transaction price may differ
from the market price because information regarding market supply and demand are
uncertain.  The less certain participants’ knowledge of market supply and demand, the
wider are the bands.  Ward et al., using a fed cattle market simulator, found that cash
market transaction prices were more variable when sizeable proportions of the fed cattle
market were under marketing agreement contracts.  Several previous studies have
suggested market size and liquidity are important determinants of price dispersion (e.g.,
Stigler; Tomek).  As the bands in figure 1 widen, transaction prices become more
variable and it is more likely individual transactions will result in prices different from
each other and the efficient equilibrium market price level.
An important point should be made regarding the price bands in figure 1.  Narrow
(efficient) bands do not mean all cattle, for example, sold on any given day should bring
the same price.  In fact, the contrary is true if cattle sold on any day exhibit significant
quality variation.  Narrow bands mean cattle of equal quality, sold at a particular time,
will bring similar prices that are all near their market value.  Wide bands mean different
pens of similar quality cattle sold at the same time may bring significantly different
prices.  So, an efficient price discovery process occurs when individual transaction prices
most closely reflect market conditions at that time for the quality of cattle being sold.
Price discovery is not a costless activity.  Individual buyers and sellers involved in price
discovery have search costs that include collecting and analyzing recent market
fundamentals and finding a party to trade with in order to arrive at a discovered price that
is reflective of uncertain current market conditions (Stigler).  This means to be effective






Figure 1.  Price Discovery3
bands, producers and packer-buyers must each possess knowledge of recent and expected
demand and supply.  Schroeder and Graff also found that producer knowledge of cattle
quality carries a significant value and is essential to the price discovery process.  In
addition, discovery is important because price itself contains important information for
market participants (Garbade, Pomrenze, and Silber; Grossman and Stiglitz). If either
party is uninformed, they are more likely to realize less favorable prices than if they were
informed.  In this regard, since packers are concentrated, buy large amounts of cattle or
hogs regularly, and have a comparative advantage collecting market information, they are
likely more informed of market conditions than most producers.  Therefore, it is critical
for producers to have access to reliable and timely price information if they are going to
be successful at negotiating prices for individual pens of cattle or hogs marketed on a
given day.  Anderson et al. found that limiting market information in an experimental
simulation setting significantly increased price variability and increased the difficulty of
price discovery. Thus, access to recent price information is critical for helping to balance
information levels between packers and producers.
Livestock Marketing Trends
Pricing methods used to market hogs and cattle have changed considerably over the past
decade.  This trend has coincided with the trend toward increased contracting (Hayenga
et al.) and has been accomplished largely via formula prices.  Formula pricing refers to
establishing a transaction price for a particular quality and quantity of livestock at a
specific time and place based upon an external reference price.  Formula pricing has been
common in grains for a long time where local cash prices are often tied to a terminal
price (or nearby futures price) less a transportation and local grain elevator handling
margin.  Its prominence in livestock markets has recently increased significantly.
A survey of 12 leading pork packers in January 2000, conducted by Grimes and Meyer
for the National Pork Producers Council (NPPC) determined that only 25.7% of hogs
were purchased on a cash market basis (table 1).  This compared to 35.8% just one year
earlier.  In 2000 74.3% of the hogs were procured using non-cash methods, up from
64.2% in 1999 and 56.6% in 1997.  Importantly, nearly all formula-priced transactions
for hogs are based on a single market report, the Iowa-Southern Minnesota spot market
price or the closely related Western Cornbelt Lean market.4
Table 1.  Hog Pricing Methods, January 1997, 1999, and 2000.
 Percent of Hogs Purchased
Pricing Method Jan. 2000 Jan. 1999 1997
Formula (reported price + some amount) 47.2 44.2 39.1
Fixed tied to futures (i.e., cash contract)     8.5   3.4   2.9
Fixed tied to feed prices, no ledger      3.3   2.9
Fixed tied to feed prices, with ledger      9.0   6.9 5.3
a
Window risk sharing, no ledger      3.8   3.6
Window risk sharing, with ledger      0.8   1.0   3.1
 a
Other (packer-owned, internal transfer)       1.7   2.3   6.1
Total Non-Cash Purchases 74.3 64.2 56.6
Total Cash Market Purchases 25.7 35.8 43.4
a Categories were not split between contracts with a ledger and without a ledger in 1997.
Source:  Grimes and Meyer.
Formula pricing is also becoming more common in fed cattle markets.  During
1990 contract and formula priced cattle typically represented 10-15% of weekly fed cattle
marketings in Kansas.  By 2000, non-cash procurement methods generally represented
more than 50% of fed cattle marketings in Kansas and occasionally exceeded 80% of
weekly marketings (figure 2).  Fed cattle marketings in Colorado, Texas, and Nebraska
(not shown here) exhibit a similar trend over this same time period.
Figure 2.  Weekly Contracted or Formulated Kansas Fed 






































Source: USDA and K-State Research and Extension5
The upward trend in contract and formula pricing is primarily a result of several factors
including benefits accruing to both buyers and sellers from entering into marketing
agreements. These benefits include reduced costs for both buyers and sellers compared to
discovering prices for each transaction, and reduced search costs by both parties
(Schroeder et al.). This trend is also associated with increased movement toward grid
pricing which often starts with a base price established via formula (Ward, Feuz, and
Schroeder).
However, formula pricing also presents several potential problems.  Formula-priced hogs
do not contribute to price discovery.  Currently, formula-price arrangement terms are not
publicly collected or disclosed by the USDA.  As a result, formula pricing agreements are
not visible to the market.  Mandatory price reporting legislation may impact the amount
of information made publicly available regarding formula hog trade.  However, how
much this legislation might reveal that is useful for price discovery is not clear, but it will
likely be modest.
Formula pricing is also problematic if the external price used as a base in the formula is
thinly traded or subject to manipulation.  Agreements using recent local cash market
prices (e.g., the previous week’s price) for a base are a concern if the base is either thinly
traded or, some days or weeks, not even traded at all.  For example, some formula pricing
arrangements for hogs are tied to a mid-session reported price for the Iowa-Southern
Minnesota direct trade (cash market) on a specific day.  Given that only a quarter of all
hogs are sold in the cash market, the cash market in a single geographic market on a
specific day and for a specific within-day trading period is very thin, nearly by definition.
Some buyers allegedly only bid higher on cash market hogs after the mid-session report
is released, so as not to increase the base price in their formula trades.  Whether or not the
thin market leads to price manipulation, it severely decreases the confidence in using that
market as a formula pricing base.
Despite drawbacks to formula pricing, the economic incentives to formula pricing for
individual producers and packers are strong.  The market environment is increasingly
encouraging more formula or long-term non-cash pricing methods.  In the short run,
regulatory or legislative action curtailing such pricing methods would reduce or eliminate
their use.  However, given significant incentives for using formula pricing methods,
legislative curtailment of such trading methods would likely be counterproductive.
Daily cash cattle markets have become particularly thin.  Fed cattle are frequently
marketed in large bunches one or two days per week.  As shown in figure 3, on many
days, no cattle sales occur, thus no current public price information exists (Schroeder et
al.).  In the early 1990s more than 90% of trading days had an AMS cash price quote.  By
the late 1990s this has declined to less than 50% of days in Texas and Kansas having a
cash fed cattle price quote in the daily mid-session report.  Common verbiage contained
in daily AMS fed cattle price reports is,  “Trade quiet.  No sales of slaughter steers or
heifers confirmed.  Inquiry and demand light.”  Lack of available cash market price data
makes price discovery for cash market trade difficult.  Market participants buying and6
selling cattle on a particular day may not have much information regarding recent fed
cattle prices.  This increases uncertainty about expected supply and demand, thereby
raising the likelihood the discovered transaction prices will not accurately reflect market
conditions.  Evidence of this was found in the Anderson et al. study estimating the value
of public information.
Many formula-priced cattle sales rely on an external reference price for establishing a
base price (Ward, Feuz, and Schroeder).  The reference price is used to establish the base
market price for the cattle.  Cash market prices, such as USDA’s Western Kansas direct
fed cattle trade price quote or the Iowa-Southern Minnesota direct slaughter hog trade
price quote, are widely used as an external reference price.  Often the previous week’s
average price is used as opposed to a single day’s quote which means an external
reference price is almost always available for use in a formula.  However, when cash
market trade is sporadic, thin, or represents a small portion of total marketings, the cash
market price may not be representative of market conditions.  As the trend towards
carcass-weight pricing increases, the quality of cattle and hogs traded in the cash market
is likely declining (Schroeder and Mintert 1999a, 1999b).  Thus, the cash market
becomes a residual market, i.e., a market for lower quality livestock, yet it provides the
base price for formula trades of higher quality livestock.  Therefore, illiquid cash markets
often affect more than just cash market trade.
Implications for Research and Extension
University research and extension programs have a rich tradition of developing
knowledge and providing information on cash livestock markets.  Research support has
included an extensive literature in the areas of market efficiency, market liquidity, spatial
Figure 3.  Percentage of Daily Mid-Session Fed Cattle Cash 
Prices in which No Price was Reported by AMS, Kansas, 
















































markets, price-quality relationships, temporal pricing issues, vertical market price
relationships, effects of market structure on prices, market information, and agricultural
policy issues targeted toward cash markets and market information.  Extension efforts
dealing with cash livestock markets have included extending this research in addition to
providing education and information on cash market outlook and cash-futures basis
relationships.
The purpose of this organized symposium is to determine the changing role of, and
implications for, university research and extension programs in light of marked changes
occurring in traditional cash livestock markets.  In particular several questions surface
regarding the role of university research and extension programs as cash market liquidity,
representativeness, and importance decline:
• What are the implications of this for buyer competition, access to public information,
and market efficiency?  Can viable commodity futures contracts exist without active
and liquid cash markets?  How important are cash markets for efficient price
discovery?  When are thin cash markets too thin for efficient price discovery?  What
are the alternatives?
• Should university research and extension programs refocus efforts away from
studying cash market prices and pricing toward issues associated with long-term
contractual developments?  Will we have access to reliable data or will it be
proprietary in nature?  By shifting our emphasis, are we contributing to the demise of
cash markets?  Should our efforts shift from farm-level price discovery to wholesale
and retail price discovery?  With less data, do we have adequate tools to correctly
estimate impacts?  Should our efforts shift to e-markets?  Can we design and guide
the direction of e-trading towards efficient markets for livestock?
• What are the changing information needs of producers as cash markets disappear?
What role do public university researchers and extension specialists have in an
environment that is increasingly substituting private negotiations for public price
discovery?  What are the impacts of working explicitly or implicitly with vertically
coordinated systems involving a few, large agribusiness firms instead of a broader
taxpayer base?  If the livestock-meat sector is transitioning from spot market price
discovery to privately-determined price discovery, what can the public sector do to
guide and assist participants in the transition.  Can we identify the most desirable
pricing system for the future?8
References
Anderson, J.D., C.E. Ward, S.R. Koontz, D.S. Peel, and J.N. Trapp.  “Experimental
Simulation of Public Information Impacts on Price Discovery and Marketing
Efficiency in the Fed Cattle Market.”  J. Agr. and Resource Econ.  23(1998):262-
78.
Garbade, K.D., J.L. Pomrenze, and W.L. Silber.  “On the Information Content of Prices.”
Amer. Econ. Rev.  69(1979):50-9.
Grimes, G. and S. Meyer.  “2000 Hog Marketing Contract Study.”  Available at:
http://www.nppc.org/PROD/HogMarketContractStudy.htm.  Accessed on April 26,
2000.
Grossman, S.J. and J.E. Stiglitz.  “Information and Competitive Price Systems.”  Amer.
Econ. Rev.  66(1976):246-53.
Hayenga, M., T. Schroeder, J. Lawrence, D. Hayes, T. Vukina, C. Ward, and W. Purcell.
“Meat Packer Vertical Integration and Contract Linkages in the Beef and Pork
Industries: An Economic Perspective.”  Washington, D.C.: American Meat
Institute.  2000.
Nelson, R.G. and S.C. Turner.  “Experimental Examination of a Thin Market: Price
Behavior in a Declining Terminal Market Revisited.”  J. Agr. Applied Econ.
27(1995):149-60.
Schroeder, T.C. and J.L. Graff.  “Comparing Live Weight, Dressed Weight, and Grid
Pricing: Assessing the Value of Cattle Quality Information.” Ward, C.E., D.M.
Feuz, and T.C. Schroeder.  Formula Pricing and Grid Pricing Fed Cattle:
Implications for Price Discovery and Variability.  Research Bulletin 1-99, Research
Institute on Livestock Pricing, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA.  January 1999.
Schroeder, T.C. and J. Mintert.  “Livestock Price Discovery: Trends and Issues.”
Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State University.  1999a.
Schroeder, T.C. and J. Mintert.  “Market Hog Price Discovery: Trends, Issues, and
Recommendations.”  Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State
University.  1999b.
Schroeder, T.C., C.E. Ward, J. Mintert, and D.S. Peel.  “Beef Industry Price Discovery: A
Look Ahead.”  Research Bulletin 1-98, Research Institute on Livestock Pricing,
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA.  March 1998.
Stigler, G.J.  “The Economics of Information.”  J. Pol. Econ. 69(1961):213-25.9
Tomek, W.G.  “Price Behavior in a Declining Terminal Market.”  Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
62(1980):434-44.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Colorado Feedlot Weekly Summary.  Agricultural
Marketing Service, Washington DC.  Various issues.
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Weekly Summary of Kansas Feedlot Sales.  Agricultural
Marketing Service, Washington DC.  Various issues.
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Weekly Summary of Nebraska Feedlot Sales.
Agricultural Marketing Service, Washington DC.  Various issues.
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Texas Panhandle and Western Oklahoma Feedlot
Weekly Summary.  Agricultural Marketing Service, Washington DC.  Various
issues.
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Colorado Feedlot Report.  Agricultural Marketing
Service, Washington DC.  Various issues.
U.S. Department of Agriculture.   Kansas Feedlot Sales.  Agricultural Marketing Service,
Washington DC.  Various issues.
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Nebraska Feedlot Sales.  Agricultural Marketing
Service, Washington DC.  Various issues.
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Texas Panhandle and Western Oklahoma Feedlot.
Agricultural Marketing Service, Washington DC.  Various issues.
Ward, C.E., D.M. Feuz, and T.C. Schroeder.  Formula Pricing and Grid Pricing Fed
Cattle: Implications for Price Discovery and Variability.  Research Bulletin 1-99,
Research Institute on Livestock Pricing, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA.  January
1999.
Ward, C.E., S.R. Koontz, T.L. Dowty, J.N. Trapp, and D.S. Peel.  “Marketing Agreement
Contracts in an Experimental Market for Fed Cattle.”  Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
81(1999):347-58.